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INTRODUCTION
Every morning millions of children in public school begin their day
by reciting the Pledge of Allegiance (“Pledge”).1 Michael Newdow, a
1. See Newdow v. United States Cong., 328 F.3d 466, 472 (9th Cir. 2002)
(O’Scannlain, J., dissenting), rev’d sub nom., Elk Grove Unified School District v.
Newdow, 124 S. Ct. 2301 (2004) (noting that the decision of the Ninth Circuit
prohibiting recitation of the Pledge in public schools in nine states affected over 9.6
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proclaimed atheist and father of a young girl attending public school
in California, challenged the constitutionality of having public school
teachers lead students in the recitation of the Pledge.2 After
prevailing in the Ninth Circuit, the Supreme Court dismissed
Newdow’s case on prudential standing grounds and never reached the
merits of the constitutional challenge.3
Newdow was not the first to challenge the daily recitation of the
Pledge in public school.4 In 1992, the Seventh Circuit upheld an
Illinois law mandating recitation of the Pledge in public school,
holding that it is permissible for a law to require public school
teachers to lead the Pledge every day, so long as students have the
option not to participate.5 The Ninth Circuit, however, concluded in
2003 that a public school policy requiring teachers to lead students in
the recitation of the Pledge was unconstitutional.6 In 2004, the
Supreme Court dismissed the case for lack of prudential standing.7
I. FACTUAL BACKGROUND
A national youth magazine first introduced the Pledge in 1892 as
part of the United States’ 400th anniversary of Columbus’s discovery
of America.8 The first version of the Pledge was: “I pledge allegiance
to my Flag and the Republic for which it stands: one Nation
indivisible, with liberty and Justice for all.”9 In the 1920s, the National
Flag Conferences amended the Pledge, changing “my Flag” to “the

million students).
2. See Newdow v. United States Cong., No. CIV S-00-0495 MLS PAN PS, 2000
U.S. Dist. LEXIS 22367, at *1, 3 (E.D. Cal. May 25, 2000), rev’d, 328 F.3d 466 (9th
Cir. 2002), rev’d sub nom., Elk Grove Unified School District v. Newdow, 124 S. Ct.
2301 (2004) (recommending dismissal of the case because the Pledge does not
violate the Establishment Clause of the First Amendment).
3. Elk Grove Unified School District v. Newdow, 124 S. Ct. 2301 (2004).
4. See, e.g., W. Va. State Bd. of Ed. v. Barnette, 319 U.S. 624, 642 (1943)
(holding unconstitutional a rule where all public schoolchildren who failed to salute
the United States flag and recite the Pledge faced school suspension). The plaintiffs
brought the constitutional challenge in Barnette before Congress added the words
“under God” to the Pledge. Id. at 624.
5. See Sherman v. Cmty. Consol. Sch. Dist. 21 of Wheeling Township, 980 F.2d
437, 439 (11th Cir. 1992) (interpreting the Illinois law mandating recitation of the
Pledge to mean that teachers are required to lead “willing students” in its recitation
every day); see also County of Allegheny v. ACLU, 492 U.S. 573, 602-03 (1989)
(indicating in dicta that the Pledge is constitutional); Sch. Dist. of Abington v.
Schempp, 374 U.S. 203, 303-04 (1963) (Brennan, J., concurring) (noting the
constitutionality of the Pledge in dicta).
6. See Newdow, 328 F.3d at 487.
7. Newdow, 124 S. Ct. at 2312.
8. Id. at 2305 (citing J. BAER, THE PLEDGE OF ALLEGIANCE: A CENTENNIAL HISTORY,
1892-1992, 3 (1992)).
9. Id.
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flag of the United States of America.”10 The Pledge was codified in a
1942 Joint Resolution, which included a description of how people
should stand while reciting it.11 In 1954, the United States Congress
enacted an amendment to add the words “under God” to the
language of the Pledge (“1954 Act”).12 This amended version, still
current today, reads: “I pledge allegiance to the Flag of the United
States of America, and to the Republic for which it stands, one nation
under God, indivisible, with liberty and justice for all.”13
The legislative history of the 1954 Act, which added the words
“under God” to the Pledge, demonstrates Congress’s objective to have
millions of school children, on a daily basis, “‘proclaim in every city
and town, every village and rural schoolhouse, the dedication of our
Nation and our people to the Almighty.’”14 The House Report
accompanying the 1954 Act stated that, “‘[f]rom the time of our
earliest history our peoples and our institutions have reflected the
traditional concept that our Nation was founded on a fundamental
belief in God.’”15
California state law requires that public schools start each school
day with “appropriate patriotic exercises” and that the recitation of
the Pledge satisfies the requirement.16 To carry out this state law, the
Elk Grove Unified School District (“EGUSD”), the district in which
Newdow’s daughter attends public school, implemented a policy
requiring all elementary school classes to recite the Pledge each day.17
Newdow brought suit in federal court on his own behalf, as well as
that of his daughter’s by suing as her “next friend.”18 He claimed that
the 1954 Act, the California state law requiring schools to begin the
day with patriotic exercises, and EGUSD’s policy of leading students
in the Pledge every morning violated his and his daughter’s First

10. Id.
11. See id. at 2306 (citations omitted) (describing that the Pledge is to “be
rendered by standing with the right hand over the heart; extending the right hand,
palm upward, toward the flag” and men should remove headdress).
12. 4 U.S.C. § 4 (1954).
13. Id.
14. Newdow v. United States Cong., 292 F.3d 597, 609 (9th Cir. 2002),
superceded by 328 F.3d 466 (9th Cir. 2003) (quoting 100 CONG. REC. 8618 (1954)
(statement of Senator Ferguson)) (incorporating the signing statement of President
Eisenhower), rev’d sub nom., Elk Grove Unified School District v. Newdow, 124 S. Ct.
2301 (2004).
15. Newdow, 124 S. Ct. at 2306 (quoting H.R. REP. NO. 1693, 83d Cong., 2d Sess.,
at 2 (1954)).
16. CAL. EDUC. CODE § 52720 (2004).
17. Newdow, 328 F.3d at 482-83.
18. See Newdow, 292 F.3d at 602 (noting that, because the parties did not
advance arguments regarding the constitutionality of the California state law, the
court would not separately address that issue).
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Amendment rights under the Establishment Clause.19 He argued that
the practice of reciting the Pledge interfered with his right as a parent
to direct his daughter’s religious education.20 He also identified
injury to his daughter, who must “watch and listen as her stateemployed teacher in her state-run school leads her classmates in a
ritual proclaiming that there is a God, and that our’s [sic] is ‘one
nation under God.’”21 While Newdow brought several challenges
against multiple parties,22 the Supreme Court was presented only with
his personal claim challenging EGUSD’s Pledge recitation policy.23
II. LEGAL BACKGROUND
Standing and the Establishment Clause of the First Amendment
were the two primary legal issues the parties litigated.
A. Standing
A plaintiff must satisfy two types of standing to sue in federal court:
Article III standing and prudential standing.24 Article III standing
requires a plaintiff to present to a court a “case or controversy” that
his or her desired judgment will remedy.25 Prudential standing, on
the other hand, is a principle by which federal courts self-impose a
limit to exercise jurisdiction in order to avoid deciding “generalized
grievances [which are] more appropriately addressed in the
representative branches.”26 In other words, courts require plaintiffs
to have prudential standing so that a party does not raise the legal
rights of another person.27

19. Newdow, 328 F.3d at 483.
20. See id. at 485.
21. Id. at 483 (citations omitted); see also id. (noting that Newdow does not claim
that his daughter is forced to recite the Pledge).
22. See id. at 484 (dismissing Newdow’s claim against the President because he is
not the appropriate plaintiff in a suit challenging the validity of a federal statue). The
court determined it lacked jurisdiction over Congress because, pursuant to the
Speech and Debate Clause of the Constitution, the court cannot direct Congress to
amend or enact legislation, which is what Newdow sought. Id. It also dismissed for
lack of Article III standing Newdow’s claim against the Sacramento City Unified
School District, the school district that his daughter planned on attending in the
future, because that school district could not have caused Newdow or his daughter an
actual or imminent injury since his daughter was not a student there at the time of
suit. Id. at 485.
23. Newdow, 124 S. Ct. at 2305.
24. Id. at 2308-09.
25. Id. at 2308 (citing Lujan v. Defenders of Wildlife, 504 U.S 555, 559-62
(1992)).
26. Allen v. Wright, 468 U.S. 737, 751 (1984).
27. See id. at 751 (explaining that to satisfy prudential standing, a plaintiff’s
“complaint [must] fall within the zone of interests protected by the law invoked”).
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B. The Establishment Clause
The Establishment Clause states that “Congress shall make no law
respecting an establishment of religion.”28 In recent years, the
Supreme Court has used three tests when considering First
Amendment attacks in the context of public education: the
endorsement, coercion, and Lemon tests. 29
The endorsement test forbids the government from “conveying or
attempting to convey a message that religion or a particular religious
belief is favored or preferred.”30 The coercion test measures whether
the government has coerced anyone “to support or participate in
religion or its exercise” or acted “in a way which establishes a state
religion or religious faith, or tends to do so.”31 Finally, to pass the
Lemon test, a statute must first, have a “secular legislative purpose;
second, its principal or primary effect must be one that neither
advances nor prohibits religion,”32 and third, “the statute must not
foster an excessive government entanglement with religion.”33
III. PROCEDURAL HISTORY
A. District Court
United States Magistrate Judge Peter Nowinski first heard Newdow’s
claims and, in a terse opinion, concluded that the Pledge did not
violate the Establishment Clause.34 United States District Court Judge
Edward Schwartz affirmed the magistrate’s recommendation and
dismissed Newdow’s case.35
B. Appellate Court
The Ninth Circuit published three opinions in Newdow v. U.S.
Congress. The court’s initial opinion (“Newdow I”) provides a
28. U.S. CONST. amend. I.
29. Newdow, 292 F.3d at 605-11.
30. County of Allegheny, 492 U.S. at 593 (emphasis omitted) (quoting Wallace v.
Jaffree, 472 U.S. 38, 70 (1985) (O’Connor, J., concurring)); see also id. at 594
(quoting Lynch v. Donnelly, 465 U.S. 668, 687 (1984) (O’Connor, J., concurring))
(noting that to refrain from endorsing religion means that the government may not
make “adherence to a religion relevant” to an individual’s “standing in the political
community”).
31. Lee v. Weisman, 505 U.S. 577, 587 (1992) (quoting Lynch, 465 U.S. at 678).
32. Lemon v. Kurtzman, 403 U.S. 602, 612-13 (1971) (quoting Bd. of Ed. v. Allen,
392 U.S. 236, 243 (1968)).
33. Id. at 613 (quoting Walz v. Tax Comm’n, 397 U.S. 664, 674 (1970)).
34. See Newdow, 2000 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 22367, at *3 (finding that the Pledge
satisfies both the Lemon and endorsement tests).
35. See Newdow, 328 F.3d at 483 (summarizing the procedural history of the
case).
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thorough Establishment Clause analysis,36 however, it was later
superceded by a less substantive amended decision (“Newdow III”).37
In between these two cases, the Ninth Circuit issued its second
opinion (“Newdow II”) in response to the motion for leave to
intervene that the mother of Newdow’s daughter filed with the
court.38
1. Newdow I
The Ninth Circuit reversed the district court’s dismissal of
Newdow’s claim and found that EGUSD’s policy and the 1954 Act of
Congress violated the Establishment Clause.39
a. Standing
While the Ninth Circuit did conduct a standing analysis, it only
addressed Article III standing.40
The court did not explore
prudential standing, the basis on which the Supreme Court ultimately
dismissed the suit.41 In its first encounter with Newdow’s challenge,
the Ninth Circuit was not presented with any information regarding
the custody status of Newdow’s daughter, and thus did not consider
the effect that such status could have on the outcome of the case.
The court first found that Newdow had standing to challenge
EGUSD’s policy of requiring teachers to begin the day with a
recitation of the Pledge, stating it was “a practice that interferes with
his right to direct the religious education of his daughter.”42
Furthermore, the Ninth Circuit concluded that any parent of a child
attending public school, including Newdow, has standing to challenge
the constitutionality of the 1954 Act.43
In deciding that Newdow had standing to challenge the 1954 Act,
the court relied in part on Wallace v. Jaffree, a case involving an

36. See Newdow, 292 F.3d at 605-11 (applying the endorsement, coercion and
Lemon tests to Newdow’s Establishment Clause challenge).
37. See Newdow, 328 F.3d at 487 (finding a violation of the coercion test, and
thus not applying the endorsement or Lemon tests).
38. See Newdow v. United States Congress, 313 F.3d 500, 501 (9th Cir. 2002)
(holding that Newdow retained his Article III standing to challenge the Pledge even
though the mother of Newdow’s daughter had legal custody of their daughter and
opposed his suit).
39. Newdow, 292 F.3d at 612.
40. See id. at 602-06.
41. See Newdow, 124 S. Ct. at 2312.
42. Newdow, 292 F.3d at 602; see id. (quoting Doe v. Madison Sch. Dist. No. 321,
177 F.3d 789, 795 (9th Cir. 1999) (en banc)) (“Parents have a right to direct the
religious upbringing of their children and, on that basis, have standing to protect
their right.”).
43. See Newdow, 292 F.3d at 604-05.
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amendment to an Alabama statute.44 The Alabama legislature
amended a statute that initially permitted a one-minute period of
silence for “meditation” in all public schools to instead authorize
silence for “meditation or voluntary prayer.”45 Just as the public
schoolchildren’s parents in Wallace presumably had standing to
challenge the Alabama statute,46 Newdow likewise had standing to
challenge the 1954 Act.47 Citing the legislative history of the 1954
amendment, the court concluded that the Act constituted “a religious
recitation policy” that interfered with Newdow’s right to direct his
daughter’s religious education.48
b. Establishment Clause
Having determined that Newdow had standing to challenge
EGUSD’s Pledge policy and the 1954 Act, the Ninth Circuit
proceeded to review and apply all three tests the court uses when
considering Establishment Clause attacks in the context of public
education: the endorsement, coercion and Lemon tests.49 Even
though failing any one of the tests invalidates the challenged law, the
Ninth Circuit applied all three for “purposes of completeness.”50
The Ninth Circuit found an Establishment Clause violation under
the endorsement test, which forbids the government from endorsing
or promoting religion or a particular religious belief.51 The Ninth
Circuit concluded that asserting that the United States is a nation
“under God” is “a profession of a religious belief, namely, a belief in
monotheism.”52 The text of the Pledge contains the stance that God
exists, thereby rejecting atheism as well as all non-Judeo-Christian
belief systems.53 When the school district mandates daily recitation of
44. 472 U.S. 38 (1985).
45. Id. at 40-42.
46. See Newdow, 292 F.3d at 604 (noting that the Supreme Court in Wallace did
not make an explicit determination that the plaintiffs, parents of the public
schoolchildren, had standing). The Ninth Cirucit inferred that the Wallace Court
decided the plaintiffs had standing because standing is a “jurisdictional element” that
a federal court must determine exists, even if not raised by any party. Id.
47. See id. at 603 (interpreting the holding in Wallace—that “the mere
enactment of a statute may constitute an Establishment Clause violation”—to have
broadened standing in cases where a plaintiff is challenging a public school policy
under the Establishment Clause).
48. See id. at 605 (concluding that Newdow had standing even though the 1954
Act did not create a “typical” injury in fact, which occurs when a statute compels or
prohibits a specific activity).
49. See id. at 605-11.
50. Id. at 607 (stating that the court had the option to apply any or all of the
tests).
51. See County of Allegheny, 492 U.S. at 593.
52. Newdow, 292 F.3d at 607.
53. Id. at 607-08; see also id. at 608 (quoting Lynch, 465 U.S. at 688) (finding an

Published by Digital Commons @ American University Washington College of Law, 2005

7

Journal of Gender, Social Policy & the Law, Vol. 13, Iss. 1 [2005], Art. 13

242

JOURNAL OF GENDER, SOCIAL POLICY & THE LAW

[Vol. 13:1

the Pledge, albeit on a voluntary basis, the school is impermissibly
“conveying a message of state endorsement of a religious belief.”54
The court also concluded that the school district’s policy and the
1954 Act violated the coercion test, a test ensuring that the
Constitution “at a minimum, . . . guarantees that government may not
coerce anyone to support or participate in religion or its exercise, or
otherwise to act in a way which establishes a state religion or religious
faith, or tends to do so.”55 In Lee v. Weisman, the Supreme Court
invalidated a policy allowing clergy to offer nonsectarian prayers at
public middle and high school graduation ceremonies.56 The Court
in Lee held that the school’s control and supervision of the
graduation ceremony impermissibly pressured students to either
participate in or show respect for the prayer by standing or remaining
silent.57 A student who stood silently likely believed it signified his or
her participation in the prayer, and the Court concluded that students
cannot be put in the position of having to either participate in a
religious ceremony or protest.58
Analogizing this case to Lee, the Ninth Circuit concluded that both
the 1954 Act and the EGUSD policy of daily recitation of the Pledge
places students in the “untenable position” of having to choose
between participating in or protesting against an exercise with
religious content.59 The court noted the particular impressionability
of schoolchildren because of their age and perceived expectation to
conform to the norms of their school, teachers, and classmates.60
Lastly, the Ninth Circuit found that the 1954 Act failed the first
prong of the Lemon test, which requires a statute to have a secular
purpose.61 The court rejected the argument put forth by the
defendants (which included the United States Congress, the United
States, and the President of the United States) that the court should
consider the Pledge in its entirety, because Newdow specifically

endorsement test violation because the Pledge “sends a message to unbelievers ‘that
they are outsiders, not full members of the political community, and an
accompanying message to adherents that they are insiders, favored members of the
political community’”).
54. Id. at 608.
55. Id. at 606 (quoting Lee, 505 U.S. at 587).
56. See Lee, 505 U.S. 507-09 (warning that any perceived state authority that
endorses religion threatens the Establishment Clause).
57. Id. at 593.
58. Id.
59. Newdow, 292 F.3d at 608.
60. See id. at 609 (asserting that with younger individuals, merely being forced to
listen to the Pledge has a coercive effect).
61. See id. at 609-10 (citing Lemon, 403 U.S. at 612-13).
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challenged Congress’s 1954 amendment.62 The purpose of that act,
indeed its “sole purpose,” was to advance religion and distinguish the
United States from atheist communist countries.63 An impermissible
government endorsement of religion includes favoring one religion
over others, as well as advancing religion in general over atheism.64
The court likewise concluded that the EGUSD policy failed the
Lemon test because it is probable that the schoolchildren perceived
that the school, and thus the government, endorsed the beliefs of
those who believe in monotheism and disapproved of atheist beliefs.65
2. Newdow II
After the Ninth Circuit held that the 1954 Act and the EGUSD
policy violated the Establishment Clause, the mother of Newdow’s
daughter, Sandra Banning, filed a motion for leave to intervene with
the court, in which she challenged Newdow’s standing.66 In this
motion, she informed the court that she believed that it was contrary
to her daughter’s best interests to be included in Newdow’s suit, and
asserted that she had sole legal custody of their daughter pursuant to
a California Superior Court order.67 The California court’s custody
order gave Newdow the right to consult with Banning on various
aspects of their daughter’s upbringing, including her psychological
and educational needs, and conferred Banning with veto power over
Newdow in the event they disagreed.68
Approximately seven weeks after Banning filed her motion for leave
to intervene, a California Superior Court entered an in personam
order enjoining Newdow from representing his daughter as her next
friend or pleading her as an unnamed party in the suit challenging
62. See id. at 610 (stating that the defendants argued that the Pledge, in its
entirety, represents a solemnizing event, expressing confidence in the future and
encouraging recognition in society).
63. Id. at 610.
64. Id.
65. See id. at 611 (noting that the impressionability of young children and the
pressures existing in the classroom make it more likely that the schoolchildren will
perceive a message of endorsement of monotheism).
66. See Newdow, 313 F.3d at 502.
67. Id. at 501-02.
68. See id. at 502 (detailing the California Superior Court’s custody order).
The child's mother, Ms. Banning, to have sole legal custody as to the rights
and responsibilities to make decisions relating to the health, education and
welfare of [the child]. Specifically, both parents shall consult with one
another on substantial decisions relating to non-emergency major medical
care, dental, optometry, psychological and educational needs of [the child].
If mutual agreement is not reached in the above, then Ms. Banning may
exercise legal control of [the child] that is not specifically prohibited or
inconsistent with the physical custody order. The father shall have access to
all of [the child's] school and medical records.
Id.
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the constitutionality of the Pledge.69 The state court did not
determine whether Newdow had standing in his own right to sue in
federal court, reserving that question for the federal court.70
After considering Banning’s motion for leave to intervene and the
state court’s order that Newdow refrain from suing as his daughter’s
next friend, in a second published opinion, the Ninth Circuit denied
Banning’s motion71 and confirmed Newdow’s Article III standing to
challenge the constitutionality of government action affecting his
daughter in public school.72 The court held that “a noncustodial
parent, who retains some parental rights, may have standing to
maintain a federal lawsuit to the extent that his assertion of retained
parental rights under state law is not legally incompatible with the
custodial parent’s assertion of rights.”73
Having already decided that Newdow satisfied Article III standing in
its initial decision,74 the court went on to analyze whether Newdow
retained standing even though Banning, the sole legal custodian of
their daughter, opposed Newdow’s execution of the lawsuit.75
Despite Banning’s status as sole custodian, the Ninth Circuit found
that the California court’s custody order granted Newdow “sufficient
parental rights” to support Newdow’s standing.76 And because
Newdow’s suit was premised on a deprivation of “his own” rights,
Banning’s opposition to Newdow’s suit could not affect his standing
to challenge his alleged First Amendment injury.77
3. Newdow III
The Ninth Circuit’s third encounter with Newdow’s case came in
the form of a petition for rehearing en banc.78 The majority denied
the petition for rehearing amid a strong dissent,79 and filed an
69. Id.
70. Id.
71. See id. at 505 (denying Banning’s motion for leave to intervene because she
did not have a “protectable interest at stake” in Newdow’s suit).
72. Id. at 505 (concluding that Newdow retained “sufficient parental rights to
support his standing”).
73. Id. at 503-04; see also id. at 504 (assuming that the parent can demonstrate
that a favorable decision will redress his or her alleged injury in fact).
74. See id. at 504 (articulating the Article III standing requirements: the plaintiff
must “establish an injury in fact that is fairly traceable to the challenged action, and it
is likely that the injury will be redressed by a favorable decision”).
75. Id. at 503.
76. Id. at 505.
77. Id. at 505-06.
78. See Newdow, 328 F.3d at 466.
79. See id. at 472 (O’Scannlain, J., dissenting) (arguing the Ninth Circuit should
rehear the case en banc because it was decided “wrong, very wrong” and that reciting
the Pledge “cannot possibly be an ‘establishment of religion’”); see also id. at 482
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amended decision superceding its initial decision.80 While its
amended opinion mirrored its initial decision in some respects, it did
not contain a discussion of the constitutionality of the 1954 Act.81
The amended opinion was limited to the narrower issues of whether
Newdow had standing to challenge EGUSD’s policy of daily Pledge
recitation and whether that policy was constitutional.82
a. Standing
The amended opinion’s discussion of Newdow’s standing to
challenge the school policy was identical to that articulated in the
court’s first opinion. As a parent, Newdow had standing to challenge
a policy that interfered with his right to instruct the religious
education of his daughter.83
b. Establishment Clause
The Ninth Circuit concluded that a daily, teacher-led recitation of
the Pledge violated the Establishment Clause of the First Amendment
because it “impermissibly coerces a religious act.”84 Finding a
violation of the coercion test, the court omitted an application of the
endorsement and Lemon tests.85 The Ninth Circuit concluded that
reciting the Pledge amounts to swearing allegiance to monotheism.86
The court focused on schoolchildren’s impressionability and
perception that they must adhere to social norms, and again
concluded that daily recitation of the Pledge impermissibly placed
“students in the untenable position of choosing between participating
in an exercise with religious content or protesting.”87

(McKeown, J., dissenting) (arguing that because the recitation of the Pledge in public
schools “presents a constitutional question of exceptional importance,” the Ninth
Circuit should reconsider the case en banc). But see id. at 469 (Reinhardt, J.,
concurring) (interpreting the federal rule of procedure governing rehearing a case
en banc to mean that the case must be “both of exceptional importance and the
decision requires correction”).
80. Id. at 468.
81. See id. at 472-73 (O’Scannlain, J., dissenting) (suggesting that the majority
omitted its analysis of the constitutionality of the 1954 Act in this amended decision
to avoid Supreme Court review, and claiming that voluntary recitation of the Pledge
was not a “religious act”).
82. See id. at 484-90.
83. See id. at 485; see infra notes 40-48 and accompanying text (detailing the
Ninth Circuit’s standing analysis).
84. Id. at 487.
85. See id.
86. See id.
87. Id. at 488.
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c. Partial Dissent and Concurrence of Newdow III
Concurring in part and dissenting in part, Judge Fernandez agreed
with the majority’s decision that Newdow possessed standing to
challenge the constitutionality of EGUSD’s Pledge policy.88 However,
he determined that the policy withstood constitutional scrutiny
because the words “under God” have “no tendency” to establish
religion and present no danger to the First Amendment.89
IV. U.S. SUPREME COURT
A. Majority Opinion
The Supreme Court granted certiorari to determine whether
Newdow had standing to challenge the school district’s policy and
whether that policy ran afoul of the First Amendment.90 A five-justice
majority dismissed Newdow’s case for lack of prudential standing, with
four justices concurring in the judgment.91
In finding that Newdow lacked prudential standing to challenge
EGUSD’s policy, the Court focused on Newdow’s interests and those
of his daughter, who Banning contends is a Christian and does not
object to the Pledge, and determined that they were likely in
conflict.92 Writing for the majority, Justice Stevens stated that
Newdow’s daughter probably did not wish to assert the constitutional
challenge.93 This conflict of interests highlighted the precarious
nature of examining the rights of a third person who was not before
the Court to advocate on her own behalf.94 The Court concluded
that it was “improper for the federal courts to entertain a claim by a
plaintiff whose standing to sue is founded on family law rights that are
in dispute when prosecution of the lawsuit may have an adverse effect
on the person who is the source of the plaintiff’s claimed standing.”95
Justice Stevens reasoned that the disputed family law rights are

88. Id. at 490 (Fernandez, J., concurring and dissenting).
89. See id. at 491 (Fernandez, J., dissenting) (focusing on the purpose of the First
Amendment, which was to provide equal protection so the government does not
discriminate for or against any religion, and highlighting dicta in previous cases that
the Pledge does not violate the First Amendment).
90. Newdow, 124 S. Ct. at 2305.
91. See id.
92. See id. at 2310 (asserting that the interests of the affected persons in this case
are “in many respects antagonistic”).
93. See id. at 2310 n.7 (“Banning tells us that her daughter has no objection to
the Pledge.”).
94. See id.
95. Id. at 2312.
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inextricably intertwined with the question of standing.96 Citing to the
“domestic relations exception” to courts’ exercise of jurisdiction, the
majority concluded that generally it is better for federal courts “to
leave delicate issues of domestic relations to the state courts.”97
While California domestic relations laws vested in Newdow “a
cognizable right to influence his daughter’s religious upbringing,” the
Court stated that Newdow does not have the right to control what
others can say to his child regarding religion.98 Thus, Newdow’s right
to communicate with his daughter, a protected First Amendment
activity, is very different from his “claimed right to shield his daughter
from influences to which she is exposed while in school despite the
terms of the custody order.”99 Such protection from third parties
could be addressed through a suit as his daughter’s next friend, but
the California Superior Court stripped Newdow of that right.100
B. Concurring Opinions
In his concurrence, Justice Rehnquist accused the majority of
“erecting a novel prudential standing principle” to avoid determining
the merits of Newdow’s constitutional challenge.101 Unlike the
majority, which applied the domestic relations exception as a
limitation of federal courts’ exercise of jurisdiction, Justice Rehnquist
asserted that the domestic relations exception is a limit on federal
diversity jurisdiction.102 The Chief Justice discussed the merits of the
constitutional attack, and concluded that recitation of the Pledge
“cannot possibly lead to the establishment of a religion.”103
Justice O’Connor similarly concluded that Newdow had standing to
challenge the school policy, but found that the policy withstood an
Establishment Clause challenge.104 Justice O’Connor based her
opinion on precedent that allows the government to “acknowledge or
refer to the divine” without violating the Constitution.105 She found
96. See id. at 2309 n.5.
97. Id. at 2309 (stating that the domestic relations exception applies to cases
involving divorce, alimony, child custody and other state law issues).
98. Id. at 2311.
99. Id. at 2312.
100. Id.
101. Id. (Rehnquist, C.J., concurring).
102. See id. at 2314 (Rehnquist, C.J., concurring) (clarifying that the domestic
relations exception divests federal courts from issuing divorce, child support, and
alimony decrees).
103. See id. at 2320 (Rehnquist, C.J., concurring) (characterizing the recitation of
the Pledge as a “patriotic exercise”).
104. Id. at 2321.
105. Id. at 2323 (O’Connor, J., concurring) (acknowledging that whether or not
the Pledge is a form of “ceremonial deism” is a “close question”).
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such “ceremonial deism” implicated here.106 Likewise, concluding
that Newdow had standing, Justice Thomas asserted that recitation of
the Pledge is not an Establishment Clause violation because the
Clause was meant to protect “state establishments from federal
interference” and not individual rights.107
V. IMPLICATIONS
Having dismissed the case on prudential standing grounds, the
majority never addressed the merits of the alleged constitutional
violation. While the concurring opinions provide compelling insight
into the views of some of the Court’s members regarding the merits of
Newdow’s claim, the question of the Pledge’s constitutionality
remains.108
The concurring opinions of Justice Rehnquist, and particularly that
of Justice O’Connor, demonstrate their continued adherence to the
doctrine of ceremonial deism, which permits the government to refer
to God because the “history, character, and context” of the reference
presumably leads the reasonable observer to perceive a nonreligious
governmental purpose.109 The Ninth Circuit, however, rejected this
long-standing doctrine in striking down the Pledge.110 Had the Ninth
Circuit decision stood, it could have drastically changed Establishment
Clause doctrine in that circuit and possibly began to unravel the basis
upon which various other government practices—arguably religious
practices—and references to God have been upheld in the past.111
On the other hand, had the Supreme Court reached the merits and
rejected the Ninth Circuit’s interpretation of the Establishment
Clause, it would have either explicitly or implicitly solidified the
validity of the ceremonial deism exception to the Establishment
Clause. This would have had the effect of affirming the holdings of
106. See id. at 2323-27 (describing the four bases on which she concluded the
Pledge is “ceremonial deism”). These reasons include: 1) the history and ubiquity of
the Pledge; 2) the absence of prayer or worship; 3) the absence of a reference to a
particular religion; and 4) the negligible religious content. Id.
107. Id. at 2330-32 (Thomas, J., concurring).
108. But see Sherman, 980 F.2d at 445 (finding no constitutional violation where
public school teachers lead willing students in the Pledge each day).
109. Lynch, 465 U.S. at 676.
110. Contra Sherman, 980 F.2d at 445 (upholding the Pledge and characterizing it
as a “ceremonial reference” typical in civic life).
111. See, e.g., Lynch, 465 at 693 (O’Connor, J., concurring) (upholding the
display of a crèche and claiming that it is “no more an endorsement of religion than
such governmental ‘acknowledgements’ of religion as legislative prayers . . . printing
‘In God We Trust’ on coins, and opening court sessions with ‘God save the United
States and this honorable court’”); Allegheny, 492 U.S. at 616 (rejecting the
argument that a holiday display consisting of a Christmas tree and Chanukah
menorah endorsed religion, and characterizing it as a representation of a secular,
winter holiday season).
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circuit courts that have previously upheld other government
references to God, such as the Ninth and Tenth Circuits’ approval of
the United States’ motto “In God We Trust” and its use on United
States currency,112 as well as Ohio’s Motto “With God All Things Are
Possible.”113
Furthermore, had the Court reached the merits of Newdow’s
challenge to the Pledge, it could have used this case as an opportunity
to clarify the status of the three Establishment Clause tests.114 This
would have been particularly helpful to the legal community because
of the doubts regarding the viability of the Lemon test.115
The Supreme Court’s decision in Newdow also raises questions
about the legal rights of non-custodial parents in the federal courts,
and the interplay between state court family laws and exercise of
federal jurisdiction. Because the Court did not refute Newdow’s
Article III standing, presumably any parent with legal custody, or at
least authoritative power to make decisions about the best interests of
his or her child, could have standing to challenge the constitutionality
of the Pledge in federal court in the future.116
RACHEL PROUSER

112. See Aronow v. United States, 432 F.2d 242, 243 (9th Cir. 1970) (concluding
that the national motto has a “patriotic or ceremonial character” and does not
establish religion); Gaylor v. United States, 74 F.3d 214, 216 (10th Cir. 1996) (finding
that the federal statute establishing the national motto of “In God We Trust” is a form
of ceremonial deism). The national motto does not “convey government approval of
religious belief” because of its “historical usage and ubiquity.” Id.
113. ACLU of Ohio v. Capitol Square Review & Advisory Bd., 243 F.3d 289, 299-300
(6th Cir. 2001).
114. Compare Newdow, 292 F.3d at 605-11 (applying the endorsement, coercion
and Lemon tests to a constitutional challenge to the recitation of the Pledge in public
schools), with Sherman, 980 F.2d at 437 (upholding the constitutionality of reciting
the Pledge in public school without applying the endorsement, coercion or Lemon
tests to the plaintiff’s Establishment Clause challenge).
115. See, e.g., Mitchell v. Helms, 530 U.S. 793 (2000) (deciding an Establishment
Clause attack without applying the Lemon test); Santa Fe Indep. Sch. Dist. v. Doe, 530
U.S. 290 (2000) (analyzing an Establishment Clause challenge in public school
setting without applying the Lemon test); Sherman, 980 F.2d at 445 (claiming that
the Court’s decision in Lee left the future of the Lemon test unknown).
116. See Newdow, 124 S. Ct. at 2313 (Rehnquist, C.J., concurring) (noting that the
majority does not dispute that Newdow satisfied Article III standing).
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